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The Collective Beneficial Owners Of ~43% Of The Issued And Outstanding Shares Of Greenfire Resources And Greenfire's Largest Shareholder, Announce That They Have Requisitioned A Special Meeting Of Holders Of Common Shares For The Purpose Of Replacing...

約43%の発行済み株式を保有する集団の善良な所有者とグリーンファイアの最大株主は、 普通株主のための特別会議を要求したことを発表しました。 その目的は、...を交換することです。

Benzinga ·  11/21 08:48

The Collective Beneficial Owners Of ~43% Of The Issued And Outstanding Shares Of Greenfire Resources And Greenfire's Largest Shareholder, Announce That They Have Requisitioned A Special Meeting Of Holders Of Common Shares For The Purpose Of Replacing The Current Board Of Directors

Summary

In summary, it has become clear that the current Greenfire Board, in the face of poor operational performance, a declining share price and blatant self-dealing, has resorted to desperate corporate lawfare maneuvers to entrench themselves despite overwhelming evidence that their shareholders and the market has lost confidence in them.

Fortunately, Greenfire shareholders have another option. WEF was attracted to Greenfire likely for the same reason as many of its fellow shareholders: Greenfire owns a high-quality asset, but the company's value is currently clouded by mismanagement and a dysfunctional Board. WEF has a track record of creating value by simplifying complex corporate situations so that the underlying value of the assets can shine through, and it is confident it can once again do so with Greenfire.

WEF is requesting that the Board call a meeting of Greenfire shareholders to replace the current Board of four with six highly-qualified directors (the "Shareholder Nominees") who bring significant oil and gas, operational, public company, capital markets, mergers and acquisitions and financial experience. WEF requests that the Meeting be held promptly, and in any event by no later than January 2025.

Finally, contrary to Greenfire's baseless claims in its November 20, 2024 press release, WEF has no intention of proposing a combination of Greenfire and Strathcona at this time. Furthermore, even if it did, shareholders should rest assured that any such transaction would be subject to the approval of the majority of disinterested (i.e. non-WEF) shareholders (at both Greenfire and Strathcona), under Multilateral Instrument 61-101 - Protections for Minority Shareholders. Moreover, contrary to Greenfire's claims, all six of WEF's nominees are considered independent under applicable securities laws.

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