附錄 99.5

科創板時尚文化控股有限公司

關於公司證券交易的政策聲明
採用於2024年10月18日

目錄

一、關於交易公司證券政策概要

科創板時尚文化集團及其子公司（統稱爲「公司」）的政策是，在進行業務時，將無一例外遵守所有適用的法律和法規。每位員工、每位高管和每位董事都應該遵守這一政策。在進行公司業務時，員工、高管和董事必須避免任何違反適用法律或法規的行爲。爲了避免任何不當行爲的出現，公司的董事、高管和部分其他員工需遵守事前批准要求以及其他限制，使其無法參與涉及公司證券的交易。儘管這些限制不適用於符合1934年證券交易所法規定規則10b5-1的證券交易書面計劃，但任何此類書面交易計劃的簽訂、修改或終止均需遵守事前批准要求和其他限制。公司使擁有公司註冊證券類別10%以上股權的官員、董事或實際股東代表簽署人遞交表格3、4和5（包括修正版及有關聯合遞交協議）,符合證券交易法案第16(a)條及其下屬規則規定的要求；交易所法”下第10b5-1條的證券交易計劃，不適用於這些限制，但任何此類書面交易計劃的簽訂、修改或終止都必須遵守事前批准要求和其他限制。

II. 關於與證券交易有關的內部信息使用

A. 一般規則。

美國證券法規管銷售和購買證券，以保護投資公衆利益。

美國證券法賦予公司、其高管和董事，以及其他僱員責任，確保公司信息在證券的購買和出售過程中不被非法使用。

所有員工、高級主管和董事都應特別注意違反交易內幕信息的法律。這些法律是基於這樣一種信念，即所有交易一家公司證券的人應該對該公司的所有「實質性」信息都具有平等的獲取權。如果披露某信息會有合理可能影響(1)投資者買賣與該信息相關公司的證券的決定，或(2)該公司證券的市場價格，則該信息被認爲是「實質性」信息。雖然事先無法確定所有即將被視爲實質性的信息，但以下是一些可能包括在內的示例：收益；財務結果或預測；股息行動；兼併和收購；資本籌集和借貸活動；重大處置；重大新客戶、項目或產品；產品開發的重大進展；新技術；管理層的重大人員變動或控制權變更；進軍新市場；主要業務中的不尋常盈利或虧損；重大訴訟或法律訴訟；期權的授予；主要營銷和銷售變化。存在疑慮時，應假定該信息爲實質性。如果您不確定您所知道的信息是否爲內幕信息，您應當諮詢公司的致富金融（臨時代碼）官。除明確授權的人員外，任何人不得向公衆發佈或回答媒體、分析師或其他人的詢問。如果媒體或研究分析師與您聯繫，尋求關於公司的信息，且您未被公司的致富金融（臨時代碼）官明確授權提供信息給媒體或分析師，您應將電話轉至致富金融（臨時代碼）官。偶爾，出於合法商業原因，有必要將內幕信息披露給外部人員。這些人可能包括投資銀行家、律師、核數師或其他尋求與公司進行潛在交易的公司。在這種情況下，信息直到達成明確理解，即該信息不得用於交易目的，也不得除合法業務原因外再被披露之前，都不應傳達。例如，如果一名員工、一名高級主管或一名董事知道實質性的非公開財務信息，則該員工、高級主管或董事在該信息公開之前是被禁止買賣該公司股票的。這是因爲員工、高級主管或董事知道會導致股價變動的信息，並且讓員工或董事具有（知道股價將變動的優勢）這會讓其他投資大衆沒有的優勢是不公平的。事實上，這不僅僅是不公平的；這被認爲是欺詐和非法行爲。對這種行爲的民事和刑事處罰非常嚴厲。

一般規則可以說爲 如下：任何人如果持有材料，則買入或賣出證券均違反聯邦證券法 內幕消息。如果理智的投資者很有可能認爲信息很重要，則信息是重要的 在做出投資決策時。如果沒有以向投資者公開的方式公開披露，則屬於內幕消息 一般是在基礎廣泛的非排斥性基礎上進行的.此外，任何人擁有重要的內幕消息都是非法的 向其他人提供此類信息或建議他們買入或賣出證券。（這叫做”小費”）。 在這種情況下，他們都可能被追究責任。

證券交易委員會 （簡稱“SEC）證券交易所和原告律師側重於揭露內幕交易。違反內幕交易法律可能使內幕交易者面臨刑事罰款高達所獲利潤的三倍和長達十年的監禁，以及民事處罰（高達所獲利潤的三倍）和禁制令。此外，根據適用州法律，還可以對違規情況進行懲罰性賠償。證券法還規定，對內幕交易員工的違法行爲，控制人可能會受到民事處罰，包括位於美國境外的員工。控制人包括董事、高管和主管。這些人可能會面臨的罰款數額爲較大值，即100萬美元或內幕交易者獲利（或避免的損失）的三倍。

內部信息不應屬於可能處理或了解它的個別董事、高級職員或其他僱員。 這是公司的資產。 任何人利用這樣的信息謀求個人利益或將其泄露給公司外部的其他人都會侵犯公司的利益。 更明確地說，在與公司證券交易相關時，這是針對投資公衆成員和公司的欺詐行爲。

所有董事、執行官和公司員工都必須始終遵守這些政策。如果您未能這樣做，將會成爲內部紀律處分的理由，包括可能被終止您的僱傭關係或董事身份。

b.政策適用於誰？

對內部消息進行交易的禁令適用於董事、高管和所有其他僱員，以及獲取該信息的其他人。該禁令適用於公司及其子公司的國內和國際僱員。由於他們定期接觸機密信息，公司政策對其董事和某些僱員（「禁止」）在公司證券交易上實施額外限制。窗口組的限制將在下文F節中討論。此外，具有重要信息內幕知識的董事和某些僱員可能不時受到交易的臨時限制。Window Group）。窗口組的限制將在下文F節中討論。此外，具有重要信息內幕知識的董事和某些僱員可能不時受到交易的臨時限制。

C. 其他公司的股票。

員工、高管和董事們在公司工作中了解供應商、客戶或競爭對手的重要信息後，應保密並不得在此類公司買入或賣出股票，直至信息公開。員工、高管和董事們不應該提供有關此類股票的內幕消息。

對沖和衍生品。

僱員、高管和董事 被禁止參與任何避險交易（包括涉及期權、認沽期權、認購期權、預付變量遠期合同、股權掉期、領口套期保值和其它衍生品的交易所及其他基金類型），這些交易旨在對公司股權證券市場價值的任何變化進行對沖或投機。

在期權或其他衍生品交易中，一般都具有高度投機性和非常高風險。購買期權的人在打賭股價會迅速變動。因此，當一個人在僱主的股票中交易期權時，會引起證監會的懷疑，認爲這個人是基於內部信息進行交易，特別是在交易發生在公司公告或重大事件之前。員工、執行官或董事很難證明自己並不知道該公告或事件。

如果證監會或納斯達克注意到公司的一個或多個僱員、高管或董事在公告發布前進行了活躍的期權交易，他們將進行調查。這樣的調查可能讓公司感到尷尬（而且昂貴），並可能導致涉及者受到嚴重處罰和開支。基於這些理由，公司禁止其僱員、高管和董事交易涉及公司股票的期權或其他衍生品。該政策不適用於公司發放的僱員股票期權。僱員股票期權不能交易。

證券質押，按金帳戶。

在某些條件下，承債人可能在未徵得質押人同意的情況下出售質押證券。例如，如果客戶未能滿足看漲要求，經紀人可能在未經客戶同意的情況下出售按金帳戶內的證券。由於這樣的出售可能發生在僱員、高管或董事具有重要內部信息或其他不允許交易公司證券的情況下，公司禁止僱員、高管和董事在任何情況下質押公司證券，包括購買按金處或在按金帳戶中持有公司證券。

F. 一般指導方針。

爲確保符合適用的反欺詐法律和公司政策，應遵循以下準則：

1.  保密內部信息不得向任何人透露，除了公司內職位需要知道的人。 泄密涉及內幕消息從內部人員傳遞給其他人。 有時，這涉及明知故犯的陰謀，即消息來源者爲了獲取「獲知者」非法交易利潤的一部分而傳遞信息。 但是，即使沒有利潤預期，消息來源者如果有理由相信該信息可能被濫用，也可能承擔責任。 向他人透露內部信息就像將自己的生命交到那個人手裏一樣。 所以最安全的選擇是：不要泄密。

2. 公司證券交易 任何員工、高管或董事在持有未向公眾披露的對公司具有重要信息時，不得發出買賣訂單，或建議任何其他人發出公司證券的買賣訂單。這包括針對股票和可轉換證券的購買和銷售訂單，包括進行任何“賣空榜”交易。員工期權的行使並不受此政策約束。然而，通過行使期權而獲得的股票，將被視為任何其他股票，持有重要內幕信息的員工不得出售之。任何持有重要內幕信息的員工、高管或董事應在信息公開披露後的第三個工作日開始交易。

3.  避免投機。投資本公司普通股提供了一個機會，讓我們能夠分享未來的增長 公司。但對公司的投資和分享公司的成長並不意味著基於波動的短期投機 在市場上。此類活動使僱員、執行官或董事的個人利益與最佳利益衝突 本公司及其股東。雖然本政策並不意味著員工、執行官員或董事永遠不得出售 股份，本公司鼓勵員工、行政人員及董事避免頻繁交易公司股票。猜測 公司股票不是公司文化的一部分。

4. 在其他證券的交易中沒有員工、高管或董事應該在得知有可能影響這些證券價值的其他公司的保密消息的情況下，下達買入或賣出訂單，或建議其他人下達買入或賣出訂單，以另一家公司的證券(如供應商、收購目標或競爭對手)為對象。例如，如果員工、高管或董事通過公司來源得知公司打算從另一家公司購買資產，然後由於可能增加或減少其證券價值而下達買入或賣出那家公司股票的訂單，這將違反證券法。

5. 對於窗戶集團的限制窗戶集團由（i）公司董事、執行官、副總裁及其助理和家庭成員組成，（ii）財務報告、業務發展或法務部門的員工子集，以及（iii）可能被不時指定及被公司的致富金融(臨時代碼)及總法律顧問或具有公司類似職責的負責人告知其身份的其他人。窗戶集團對於交易公司證券有以下限制：總法律顧問窗戶集團

注意，致富金融(臨時代碼)官員和總法律顧問有時可能判斷即使已請求許可，也不得進行交易。可能不會提供任何理由，而窗口的關閉本身可能構成不應該傳達的重要內部信息。

前述的Window Group限制不適用於符合交易所法第10b5-1條下的證券交易書面計劃。10b5-1計劃 附錄 A 。然而，Window Group成員未經致富金融(臨時代碼)和總法律顧問事先批准，不得進行、修改或終止關於公司證券的10b5-1計劃，批准僅在Window期間內給予。

公司不時也可能對所有董事、董事會成員和窗口集團的其他成員實施交易凍結。 臨時 由於重大未公佈的企業發展，公司可能會時不時對所有董事、董事會成員和窗口集團的其他成員實施交易凍結。這些交易凍結的持續時間可能有所不同。

執行官、董事或任何窗口集團成員必須立即向致富金融(臨時代碼)和總法律顧問報告任何窗口集團成員本人、其助手或家庭成員進行的任何交易，而不是根據核准的10b5-1計劃（如下所定義）進行的交易。

總結： 公司的每位員工在掌握關於公司的內幕信息時都會受到交易限制。此外， 高級管理人員、董事以及其他Window Group成員在受到上述第5段限制其交易只能在窗口期間進行 並需要獲得預先批准。

您必須立即向致富金融(臨時代碼)官員和總公司法律顧問匯報，任何人對公司證券進行的交易或您有理由相信可能違反本政策或美國證券法的公司人員泄露內幕信息。

美國證券法律對國際交易的適用性。

公司所有員工及其附屬公司均受到交易公司證券和其他公司證券的限制。美國證券法可能適用於公司附屬公司或聯屬公司的證券，即使其位於美國以外的地方。涉及PRC、香港、澳洲、馬來西亞、中東或新加坡附屬公司或聯屬公司的證券交易應仔細由法律顧問審查，以確保不僅符合相應的中國內地、香港、澳洲、馬來西亞、中東或新加坡法律，還可能適用美國證券法。

III. 其他有關證券交易的限制

A. 公開再銷售-144條例。

《美國證券法》（以下簡稱「證券法」）要求每個提供或出售安防的人士，除非符合豁免註冊的條件，否則必須向SEC註冊該交易。《證券法》證券法第144條通常是公開轉售「受限證券」（指私下發行或銷售的未註冊證券）以及公司董事、高管及其他控制人員（被稱為「內部人士」）轉售公司任何證券（不論受限或不受限）所依賴的豁免標準。即缺乏透明度的數據公開轉售「受限證券」（指私下發行或銷售的未註冊證券）以及公司董事、高管及其他控制人員（被稱為「內部人士」）轉售公司任何證券（不論受限或不受限）所依賴的豁免標準。聯屬公司內部人士

根據規則144的豁免條款，只有在符合特定條件的情況下才能依賴此條款。這些條件會因公司是否受到美國證券交易委員會的報告要求（因此對於規則而言是“報告公司”）以及希望出售證券的人是否是關聯人員而有所不同。

1. 持有 期限發行者為上市公司（即接受美國證券交易委員會（SEC）的申報規定至少90天的公司）發行的受限證券在銷售前必須持有並全額付清六個月。非上市公司發行的受限證券則需遵守一年的持有期。持有期要求不適用於由聯營公司持有的證券，這些證券可以在公開市場上購買或根據《證券法》註冊公開發行的證券發行。通常，如果賣方從非公司或公司聯營公司以外的人購買證券，則賣方所購買的證券的持有期可以與出售方的持有期相連，以判定是否已滿足持有期。

2.  目前公開信息在進行銷售之前，公司的最新信息必須公開。提交給證券交易委員會的定期報告通常滿足這一要求。如果賣方不是發行證券的公司的聯營公司（並且至少已經有三個月不再是聯營公司），並且自從從發行者或發行者的聯營公司（較晚者）購買證券以來已經過去了一年，則賣方可以賣出這些證券而無需考慮當前公開信息要求。

144條規定對"聯屬人"出售股票還須符合以下額外條件。 如一個人或實體被視為"聯屬人"，因而受這些額外條件約束，如果該人或實體目前是聯屬人，或在過去三個月內曾是聯屬人：

3.  成交量限制資產負債證券數量的銷售量在任何三個月內由聯屬公司銷售的數量不得超過一個階段（或當證券為非參與優先股時的級別），以及由聯屬公司代賬戶出售的相同階段證券的銷售總數。在任何三個月內由聯屬公司銷售的股票的數量不得超過（i）該類股票的未流通股份的一％或（ii）在獲得券商或與市場maker直接執行訂單之前的四個日曆週內該類股票每周平均報告的交易量中的較大者。

4.  Manner of Sale. Equity securities held by affiliates must be sold in unsolicited brokers’ transactions, directly to a market-maker or in riskless principal transactions.

5. Notice of Sale. An affiliate seller must file a notice of the proposed sale with the SEC at the time the order to sell is placed with the broker, unless the amount to be sold neither exceeds 5,000 shares nor involves sale proceeds greater than $50,000. See “Filing Requirements”.

Bona fide gifts are not deemed to involve sales of shares for purposes of Rule 144, so they can be made at any time without limitation on the amount of the gift. Donees who receive restricted securities from an affiliate generally will be subject to the same restrictions under Rule 144 that would have applied to the donor, depending on the circumstances.

B. Private Resales.

Directors and officers also may sell securities in a private transaction without registration. Although there is no statutory provision or SEC rule expressly dealing with private sales, the general view is that such sales can safely be made by affiliates if the party acquiring the securities understands he is acquiring restricted securities that must be held for at least six months (if issued by a reporting company that meets the current public information requirements) or one-year (if issued by a non-reporting company) before the securities will be eligible for resale to the public under Rule 144. Private resales raise certain documentation and other issues and must be reviewed in advance by the Company’s General Counsel.

C. Restrictions on Purchases of Company Securities.

In order to prevent market manipulation, the SEC adopted Regulation M under the U.S. Exchange Act. Regulation M generally restricts the Company or any of its affiliates from buying Company stock, including as part of a share buyback program, in the open market during certain periods while a distribution, such as a public offering, is taking place. You should consult with the Company’s General Counsel, if you desire to make purchases of Company stock during any period that the Company is making conducting an offering or buying shares from the public.

D. Filing Requirements.

1.  Schedule 13D and 13G. Section 13(d) of the Exchange Act requires the filing of a statement on Schedule 13D (or on Schedule 13G, in certain limited circumstances) by any person or group which acquires beneficial ownership of more than five percent of a class of equity securities registered under the Exchange Act. The threshold for reporting is met if the stock owned, when coupled with the amount of stock subject to options exercisable within 60 days, exceeds the five percent limit.

A report on Schedule 13D is required to be filed with the SEC and submitted to the Company within ten days after the reporting threshold is reached. If a material change occurs in the facts set forth in the Schedule 13D, such as an increase or decrease of one percent or more in the percentage of stock beneficially owned, an amendment disclosing the change must be filed promptly. A decrease in beneficial ownership to less than five percent is per se material and must be reported.

A limited category of persons (such as banks, broker-dealers and insurance companies) may file on Schedule 13G, which is a much abbreviated version of Schedule 13D, as long as the securities were acquired in the ordinary course of business and not with the purpose or effect of changing or influencing the control of the issuer. A report on Schedule 13G is required to be filed with the SEC and submitted to the Company within 45 days after the end of the calendar year in which the reporting threshold is reached.

A person is deemed the beneficial owner of securities for purposes of Section 13(d) if such person has or shares voting power (i.e., the power to vote or direct the voting of the securities) or dispositive power (i.e., the power to sell or direct the sale of the securities). A person filing a Schedule 13D or 13G may disclaim beneficial ownership of any securities attributed to him or her if he or she believes there is a reasonable basis for doing so.

2.  Form 144. As described above under the discussion of Rule 144, an affiliate seller relying on Rule 144 must file a notice of proposed sale with the SEC at the time the order to sell is placed with the broker unless the amount to be sold during any three-month period neither exceeds 5,000 shares nor involves sale proceeds greater than $50,000.

Annex A

Overview of 10b5-1 Plans

Under Rule 10b5-1, large stockholders, directors, officers and other insiders who regularly possess material nonpublic information (MNPI) but who nonetheless wish to buy or sell stock may establish an affirmative defense to an illegal insider trading charge by adopting a written plan to buy or sell at a time when they are not in possession of MNPI. A 10b5-1 plan typically takes the form of a contract between the insider and his or her broker.

The plan must be entered into at a time when the insider has no MNPI about the company or its securities (even if no trades will occur until after the release of the MNPI). The plan must:

1. specify the amount, price (which may include a limit price) and specific dates of purchases or sales; or

2. include a formula or similar method for determining amount, price and date; or

3. give the broker the exclusive right to determine whether, how and when to make purchases and sales, as long as the broker does so without being aware of MNPI at the time the trades are made.

Under the first two alternatives, the 10b5-1 plan cannot give the broker any discretion as to trade dates. As a result, a plan that requests the broker to sell 1,000 shares per week would have to meet the requirements under the third alternative. On the other hand, under the second alternative, the date may be specified by indicating that trades should be made on any date on which the limit price is hit. The affirmative defense is only available if the trade is in fact made pursuant to the preset terms of the10b5-1 plan (unless the terms are revised at a time when the insider is not aware of any MNPI and could therefore enter into a new plan). Trades are deemed not to have been made pursuant to the plan if the insider later enters into or alters a corresponding or hedging transaction or position with respect to the securities covered by the plan (although hedging transactions could be part of the plan itself).

Guidelines for 10b5-1 Plans

When can a plan be adopted or amended? Because Rule 10b5-1 prohibits an insider from adopting or amending a plan while in possession of MNPI, allegations of insider trading despite the existence of a 10b5-1 plan are likely to focus on what was known at the time of plan adoption or amendment. It is recommended that companies permit an executive to adopt or amend a 10b5-1 plan only when the executive can otherwise buy or sell securities under the company’s insider trading policy, such as during an open window immediately after the announcement of quarterly earnings.

Should a plan impose a waiting period before trading can begin? Because an insider cannot have MNPI when a plan is adopted or amended, Rule 10b5-1 does not require the plan to include a waiting period before trading can begin. And importantly, including a waiting period (even a lengthy delay) will not correct the fatal flaw of adopting or amending a plan while in possession of MNPI. Many companies, however, require 10b5-1 plans to include a waiting period as a matter of risk management, in order to decrease the likelihood of the scrutiny that can occur when an executive’s trading activity suddenly commences before material news is announced. Practice varies as to length (anywhere from 10 days to the next open window), although the rationale for including a waiting period is usually stronger when the period is long enough to be able to say that any information currently in the insider’s possession should either be stale or public by the time trading commences. This has no bearing on the effectiveness of a 10b5-1 plan, but a longer delay can, as a matter of optics, help an insider demonstrate that he or she was not motivated to make trades by nonpublic information available at the time of plan adoption or amendment.

Should adoption of a plan be announced publicly? Generally speaking, there is no requirement to publicly disclose the adoption, amendment or termination of a 10b5-1 plan, although in some cases public announcement may be advisable due to the identity of the insider, the magnitude of the plan, or other special factors. That said, announcing the adoption of a 10b5-1 plan may be a useful way to head off future public relations issues, since announcing a plan’s adoption prepares the market and should help investors understand the reasons for insider sales when trades are later reported. If a company decides to announce the adoption of a 10b5-1 plan, we do not generally recommend disclosing plan details, other than, perhaps, the aggregate number of shares involved; this is to diminish the ability of market professionals to front-run the insider’s transactions. It is unusual to announce the suspension or termination of a plan.

What else should we consider when amending or modifying a plan? As noted above, an insider may only modify or amend a 10b5-1 plan when he or she is not in possession of MNPI. Even if an insider is not in possession of MNPI at the time of amendment, a pattern of amending or modifying one’s plan raises the question of whether the insider is using the plan as a legitimate tool to diversify his or her risk exposure and monetize assets, or as a way to opportunistically step in and out of the market. Because Rule 10b5-1 provides an affirmative defense but not a safe harbor, insiders and their companies should be aware that the effectiveness of the affirmative defense could be diminished by a pattern of plan amendments and modifications.

Can a plan be terminated or suspended? Unlike amending a plan, a 10b5-1 plan may legally be terminated before its predetermined end date even though the insider is in possession of MNPI (although some brokers’ forms prohibit this as a contractual matter). Because plan sales shortly before the announcement of bad news can generate unwanted attention, an insider may decide to terminate a plan in the face of an impending negative announcement, even though as a technical matter the affirmative defense would be expected to cover the sales. On the other hand, terminating a selling plan before an impending positive announcement may raise the suspicion that the insider is using Rule 10b5-1 as a way to opportunistically time the market, thereby risking the likelihood that his or her future use of the affirmative defense will be successful.

It is generally suggested that plan terminations initiated by an insider take place during an open window, absent special circumstances and approval by the general counsel. It may also make sense for the general counsel to have the ability, but not the responsibility, to terminate the plan. Plans should also allow for mandatory suspension if legally required, for example due to Regulation M or tax reasons.

How long should a plan last? In order to minimize the need for early termination, the term of the plan should be carefully weighed at the outset. An optimal plan term will be long enough to distance the insider, and any current knowledge that he or she may have, from a particular trade but short enough that it will not require termination should the insider’s financial planning strategies change. A short “one-off” 10b5-1 plan can appear to be timed to take advantage of MNPI. On the other hand, the longer the plan term, the greater the likelihood that it will need to be modified or terminated. Most plans tend to have a term of six months to two years.

Should the company pre-clear or review an executive’s plan? It is generally recommended that the company pre-clear or review a proposed 10b5-1 plan, which may provide assurance that the plan complies with best practices. Certain companies disallow the third type of plan (one that gives the broker the right to determine whether, how and when to make purchases) in order to avoid the evidentiary difficulty associated with proving that the executive did not communicate with the broker with respect to trades under the plan. While this is not required, this is a prudent option to consider.

In addition to requiring a 10b-5 plan to be pre-approved by the Company, other limits that are sometimes considered are whether to set a maximum percentage of holdings that can be subject to a 10b5-1 plan, and rules for setting price floors.

Annex B

Request for Approval to Trade in the Securities of Star Fashion Culture Holdings Limited

To: Chief Financial Officer / General Counsel

From:                                                                     

Print Name  

I hereby request approval for myself (or a member of my immediate family or household or a family member whose transactions regarding securities of Star Fashion Culture Holdings Limited are directed by me or are subject to my influence or control) to execute the following transaction relating to the securities of Star Fashion Culture Holdings Limited

Type of transaction (check one):

Securities involved in transaction:                                  

Number of securities:                                                             

Other (please explain):                                                          

Name of beneficial owner if other

than yourself:                                                                                                      

Relationship of beneficial owner

to yourself:                                                                                                           

Signature:                                                  Date:                                                        

This Authorization is valid until the earlier of thirty (30) calendar days after the date of this Approval or until the commencement of a “blackout” period.

Approved by:                                   

Name:                                             

Date:                                                 Time:                                                          

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