Exhibit 99.2

立場聲明

2024年10月22日

納米尺寸有限公司（"公司”, “nano”或“您”)

2 Ilan Ramon St.

Ness Ziona 7403635

以色列。

注意：董事會（“董事會”)

關於：立場聲明 - 年度股東大會

尊敬的先生/女士：

2024年10月16日，公司發佈了一份關於股東年度股東大會的通知和代理聲明，會議定於2024年12月6日舉行（下稱“Meeting）。 Murchinson Ltd.（下稱“Murchinson”）及其在信函（下文定義）簽名頁上列出的特定基金類型及/或其從屬顧問設定基金”（簡稱“提議股東「」或「」我們在這次會議中我們謹提出這份立場聲明，包括我們的要求信中所列的議程項目（即今日日期的信件）蘋果CEO庫克大規模出售股票，套現逾3億港元。”).

根據公開信息，我們目前持有公司約7.1%的股份，並且，如信函所示，要求Nano將我們的提案列入會議議程，以便公司股東對大幅改善公司的公司治理和行爲所做出投票。

在過去的兩年中，莫奇森一直在倡導對董事會進行改進，這對於長期股東價值的創造至關重要。簡單地回顧一下，在2023年3月，Nano股東們以壓倒性的票數投票決定將Yoav Stern、Oded Gera、Igal Rotem和Yoav Nissan-Cohen從董事會中罷黜。令人震驚的是，Nano做出了剝奪股東權利的舉措，並決心忽略他們明確的信息。已被85%以上投票股東拒絕的董事，包括目前的董事候選人Yoav Stern，拒絕離開董事會。董事會非法地無視了莫奇森作爲股東的權利，操縱了2023年9月股東大會的投票程序，並公然利用以色列和美國的法律系統來損害股東的利益。有關2023年3月股東特別會議和2023年股東大會（統稱爲「以色列訴訟」）的訴訟仍在進行中。儘管我們相信我們在以色列訴訟中的立場將獲勝，但目前預計以色列法院不會在會議日期後很長時間內做出判決。

股東不應等待以色列法院解決所有這些爭端。自2023年初以來發生了董事會的所謂更新，這是一種防禦性反應，旨在表現得具有響應性，但實際上並未採取任何措施來改善估值、資本配置、運營、策略或公司治理。公司持續爲負的企業價值表明市場對現任領導層持懷疑態度，並對納米的現金施加折扣，因爲市場擔心董事會的Yoav Stern和他在董事會上的朋友們會繼續浪費股東資源。面對納米價值持續被破壞的速度，繼續保持現狀可能造成的潛在傷害，公司資源的持續誤用以及治理改善的幌子，股東大會爲股東提供了一個機會，安排安裝毫無疑問獨立於管理層的新董事。

我們認爲董事會未能監督管理層，造成並繼續給股東造成傷害。 Yoav Stern 對公司和董事會的統治導致Nano的現金價值大幅折價。無法應對負企業價值所暗示的批評，Stern選擇通過將現金浪費在一系列高價、非協同、毫無意義的收購交易上來攻擊股東，而這些公司他自己以前曾譴責。

上市公司董事會有義務將股東利益置於個人利益之前，當股東利益與管理層發生衝突時，爲股東利益辯護，採取措施減少對股東的風險，確保對管理層獲得適當的報酬，並規劃管理層接班人。與這些常見義務相反，我們認爲董事會未能對管理層進行適當監督。選舉默奇森提名人，反對約阿夫·斯特恩過度和不合理的報酬，支持對董事會解除分類，以及對收購的股東批准設置有限期限要求是恢復常識和董事會層面股東責任感的必要步驟，同時保護公司資本免受進一步浪費交易。

在提案1中，董事會建議重新任命KPMG International成員Somekh Chaikin爲公司的獨立核數師，直至下次年度股東大會。

我們目前打算 棄權 關於建議 1.

默奇遜建議股東們 支持 羅伯特（鮑勃）龐斯和奧菲爾·巴哈拉夫（「默奇遜提名人」）在提案2上投票。以下是關鍵原因：默奇遜候選人）

股東已經拒絕了Stern

在2023年3月的股東大會上，有86.8%的選票支持將斯特恩從董事會中罷免。作爲回應，斯特恩發起了一項活動，試圖剝奪股東的權利。根據2023年3月的投票結果，他被罷免出董事會是正當的。 和框架。有關詳細信息，請參閱UBS集團報酬報告由於他爲鞏固自己在董事會中的地位所做出的努力。他一再表明，他不是決定Nano股東未來走向的合適領導者。

估值

該公司聲稱的超過同行的總股東回報，對於那些如此恐懼Nano未來可能的價值破壞舉措，該公司的企業價值給股東們帶來的慰藉有限。 以下 Nano及其同行的EV/營業收入倍數表（來源：彭博社）充分表明了股東對Nano及其同行的看法。

治理

邁克爾·加勒特將軍表示他打算把道德決策引入董事會，但他並未兌現。在加勒特任職期間，該董事會：(i) 在以色列戰爭開始幾天後召開特別會議，以尋求更高的薪酬計劃，然後以以色列戰爭爲藉口取消了該會議；(ii) 宣佈另一個定價過高的收購Stratasys的提議；(iii) 保留了Nano對Stratasys的投資，並損失了額外的4500萬股東的錢；(iv) 在2020年股東大會上通過延長「毒丸」以推翻股東的反對意見；(v) 在解僱約公司員工約25%「削減開支」數月後，董事會以股東的費用前往阿拉斯加進行了一次公費旅行。

多倫多阿德萊德街西145號，四樓，郵編M5H 4E5
電話 +1 416 845 0666 傳真 +1 416 981 7333

斯特恩和加勒特爲股東創造價值的承諾值得懷疑。默奇森提名人明顯是更可取的選擇，因爲他們具有技能、經驗，最重要的是獨立性——不受默奇森和Nano管理層的影響。選舉龐斯和巴哈拉夫將在董事會上安排客觀的聲音，他們了解對股東的責任——這是恢復市場對公司信任的必要第一步。

我們建議所有公司股東 支持 莫徹森提名人和 投票反對納諾提名人。

長期以來，我們的立場是Nano吸引不了合格董事的一個原因是董事會成員的報酬微薄，導致一群要麼不合格要麼因爲可疑原因願意承擔這一職責（以及相關風險和責任）的董事。一個例子是兩位前董事，Yaron Eitan和Eli David博士，他們加入董事會後進行了一項關聯交易，將零營業收入的軟件初創企業賣給Nano，交易金額超過7000萬美元。

While we believe the proxy statement for the Meeting fails to disclose pertinent information about the proposed compensation (e.g., the composition of the peer group used by the Board in setting the compensation levels), we currently intend to VOTE FOR Proposal 3. We view this as the lesser of two evils, and caution shareholders that it should not be construed as our endorsement of the various statements included in the proxy statement.

The CEO compensation proposal appears to be unnecessarily confusing. It is also incomplete because it does not include an actual copy of the contract. We struggle to understand how the Board expects shareholders to support this proposal with insufficient information to evaluate it. Additionally, the Board should have known better than to propose an unwarranted and excessive compensation package – in 2022 ISS opposed and shareholders rejected proposed changes in Series B warrant terms for Stern. We believe shareholders should reject this proposal because it is similarly offensive, including for the following key reasons:

We believe that shareholders should oppose this proposal because there is an unmitigated misalignment between CEO pay and company performance, Nano maintains significant problematic pay practices, and the Board has exhibited a significant level of poor communication and responsiveness to shareholders. We intend to VOTE AGAINST Proposal No. 4.

In furtherance of our goal to improve Nano’s corporate governance and instill a culture of accountability, we propose to amend Article 39 to repeal the Board’s classification and elect all directors annually. In our proposed amendment to Article 39, we clarify, among other things, that directors elected or appointed by the shareholders at the 2024 Meeting will hold office until the next annual meeting (unless earlier time as such director’s office is vacated).

145 Adelaide Street West, Fourth Floor, Toronto, ON M5H 4E5
Tel. +1 416 845 0666 Fax +1 416 981 7333

Annual election of Directors is widely recognized as a governance best practice. By way of confirmation, we share the following with fellow shareholders:

“Directors should be re-elected annually; classification of the board generally limits shareholders’ rights to regularly evaluate a board’s performance and select directors.”

- BlackRock Investment Stewardship Proxy voting guidelines

Effective as of January 2024

“In terms of accountability mechanisms, we believe there should be annual elections of the full board of directors.”

- State Street Global Advisors Proxy Voting and Engagement Policy

Effective March 25, 2024

“Geode will vote FOR proposals to de-classify boards.”

- Geode Voting Policies - 2024

We recommend that all of the Company’s shareholders VOTE FOR Proposal No. 5.

Since we submitted the demand to hold the March Meeting, the Board has taken every opportunity to further entrench itself, including, without limitation, by announcing it will seek “transformative transactions”, which shareholders witnessed in Nano’s wasteful and ineffective campaign to acquire Stratasys Ltd. More recently, the Desktop Metal deal announced in July 2024 and Markforged deal announced in September 2024 are rife with problems including misleading disclosure of expense, excessive valuation, and unrealistic synergy estimates. For example, Nano has told shareholders the cost of the Desktop Metal deal is $185 million, while choosing not to disclose that it will almost certainly also have to purchase, at par, $115 million of Desktop Metal outstanding notes that will inflate the total transaction cost to $300 million. A transaction that was presented with synergy estimates that would lead to break-even in four to five years will actually need ten years for shareholders to be made whole.

Stern’s philosophy regarding the role that M&A should play in Nano’s strategy was revealed in August 2023 when he threatened Murchinson’s counsel that:

“We shall raise $300 M and complete a $599 M acquisitions. And blow your client out of the Ontario lack by dilution them to a consistency of a greeze thinner. Just because YOU fucked up ... Watch me. It is not about money for me. It is about revenge ... This will be fun, for sure,” (spelling mistakes and profanities are at the source).

The proposal to require shareholder approval of an Acquisition Transaction (as defined in proposed Article 71) would improve the Company's corporate governance at a reasonable cost. In consideration of Stern’s threat, the complicity that we have seen from the Board, the Company’s “pay any price” approach to deal-making, and the rapid pace of recent transaction announcements, we do not believe that shareholders have anyone representing their interests when Nano is negotiating a transaction. Under these circumstances, adding a temporary requirement for shareholder approval of Acquisition Transactions is a critical step to protecting shareholders and preventing the destruction of shareholder value. The potential cost of this proposal is the expense of a shareholder meeting. We have intentionally limited the scope of the proposal to transactions valued at more than $50 million, a reasonable floor, and the proposal’s sunset is predetermined to occur 30 days after the 2025 AGM. In short, the proposal is designed to maximize shareholder protection in response to a specific threat from a CEO who has become unfriendly to shareholders.

We recommend that all of the Company’s shareholders VOTE FOR Proposal No. 6.

***

We believe that our proposals set forth in the enclosed Letter will help affect a long-overdue change to the Board, and importantly, help to align the Board with shareholders’ interests to maximize value.

This Position Statement should not be construed to prejudice any of our claims, rights, arguments, demands, grounds and/or remedies under any contract, the Articles of Association and/or law. It is hereby further clarified that every claim and right of the undersigned, including those in relation to the pending lawsuits between the parties, and any other matter, are fully reserved and nothing herein derogates from them.

145 Adelaide Street West, Fourth Floor, Toronto, ON M5H 4E5
Tel. +1 416 845 0666 Fax +1 416 981 7333

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